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ABSTRACT China, Russia and the Central Asian states of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,
Tajikistan and Uzbekistan formed the Shanghai Co-operation Organization (SCO) in
2001. China’s backing for an SCO charter, permanent secretariat and anti-terrorism
centre for the past three years reflects its desire to strengthen the SCO in countering
United States influence in Central Asia. Diplomatically, China fears that the Ameri-
can presence means that regional states will be less accommodating to China’s
political demands. Economically, China worries that the United States’ support for
American petroleum companies will compromise Chinese efforts to wrest conces-
sions from Central Asian governments. Security-wise, with bases close to China’s
western borders, Washington can assist Beijing in flushing out Xinjiang separatists
operating in Central Asia, or put military pressure on China, should it be perceived
as a threat. The American presence and resurgent Russian involvement in Central
Asia seem to have put China’s influence in the region on the defensive.
The Shanghai Co-operation Organization (SCO), the world’s newest
collective of regional states and one primarily concerned with managing
affairs in Central Asia, held its third annual meeting on 28 May 2003 in
Moscow. At the meeting, the presidents of the organization’s member
states – Russia, China, and the Central Asian republics of Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan – appointed China’s Ambassador
to Russia, Zhang Deguang, as the organization’s first secretary general.
They also mandated the completion of the SCO secretariat edifice by 1
January 2004. In so doing, they were only building on their last meeting
held in Russia’s St Petersburg on 7 June 2002, which agreed on a charter
defining the structure, purpose and tasks of the organization, and the
establishment of a permanent secretariat in Beijing to co-ordinate the
activities of the organization.
This article is about how China attempts to participate in matters
directly pertaining to the politics, economics and security of Central Asia,
and to secure the stability and prosperity of its own western frontier, by
engaging Russia and Central Asian countries, through the institutional
linkages provided by the SCO and its conceptual underpinnings. China
has so far chosen to take part actively in the SCO, and its precursor, the
“Shanghai Five” forum, which may be read as a sign of its confidence in
the ascendancy of its own weight and prominence in the regional affairs
of Central Asia. However, given what has been happening in the region
since the events of 11 September 2001 – the rising influence of the United
States in Central Asia, the shifting, even opportunistic, diplomatic pos-
tures of regional states, and the increasingly pro-Western leanings of the
leadership of Russia – there is a need to assess whether China’s roles and
influence in Central Asia may be hitting roadblocks. This is especially so
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since, as one analyst has observed, “without Beijing’s participation in the
SCO, there is absolutely no point in having the organization.”1 At the
minimum, the SCO will continue to provide a platform for China to
co-operate with Russia in fighting terrorism and accommodating the
American presence in Central Asia, despite Russia’s renewed activism in
the region’s affairs.
The “Shanghai Five”
The development of “Shanghai Five” and its subsequent expansion and
institutionalization into the SCO, is a significant process in international
relations, for it groups the countries of China, Russia and Central Asia
into a multilateral mechanism for regional security and economic co-
operation for the first time in history. China established initial contact
with Central Asia through the fabled Silk Road 2,000 years ago, but
direct relations with the region were severed after it became part of
Czarist Russia and then the Soviet Union. From the dissolution of the
Soviet Union in late 1991 up to 1995, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan
and Tajikistan were engaged, as a group, in the negotiation, delineation
and demarcation of their common boundaries with China. These border
talks reflected the desire of Russia and the three Central Asian countries
to forestall any attempt by an increasingly nationalistic and economically
powerful China to take advantage of the collapse of the Soviet Union to
press territorial claims in Central Asia and the Russian Far East dating
back to the Czarist and Soviet eras. Tajikistan still maintains a border
dispute with China, but Russia, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan had basically
reached agreements, so that by 26 April 1996, the heads of state of these
five countries were able to hold a meeting in Shanghai to put behind them
boundary disputes involving China, and turn to other issues of mutual
interest and concern.
The state leaders to this first “Shanghai Five” meeting explored the
need to create a mechanism to promote confidence and security in the
military sphere, and reached an accord to notify one another of military
exercises undertaken within 100 kilometres of China’s border with the
other four countries. A further agreement, signed in April 1997 at the
group’s second summit in Moscow, limited the deployment of troops to
a maximum of 130,400 personnel within 100 kilometres of China’s
border with Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. In the
Almaty Declaration that followed the third “Shanghai Five” meeting at
the Kazakh capital in July 1998, member states of the group pledged to
combat transnational security threats in the form of ethnic separatism,
religious fundamentalism, international terrorism, arms-smuggling, drug-
trafficking and other cross-border crimes. This declaration would form an
important basis for the existence of the subsequent SCO, in referring
specifically to the fight against what the Chinese termed the “three evils”
1. Vasily Bubnov, “Shanghai Co-operation Organization: what is it for?” Pravda On-line,
7 June 2002, http://emglish.pravda.ru/main/2002/06/07/29950.html.
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of separatism, fundamentalism and terrorism. In the context of Central
Asia, this linkage makes sense because the militant Muslim and ethnic
insurgents in the region typically exhibit all three characteristics, by
engaging in violent acts to realize seditious ambitions behind the spiritual
veil of Islam. Furthermore, 1998 was the year that the Islamic fundamen-
talist Taliban regime consolidated its hold over Afghanistan. At the fourth
summit of “Shanghai Five” state leaders at the Kyrgyz capital of Bishkek
in August 1999, the group accepted Kyrgyzstan’s suggestion to set up a
centre to co-ordinate anti-terrorist measures taken by member-states.2
The fifth meeting took place at Tajikistan’s capital of Dushanbe in July
2000, and saw Uzbekistan being granted observer status for
the gathering. It was at this meeting that China’s then President Jiang
Zemin suggested transforming the “Shanghai Five” from a series of
ad hoc meetings into a regular and institutionalized mechanism for
multilateral co-operation.3 The “Shanghai Five” officially became the
SCO on 15 June 2001 with the inclusion of Uzbekistan in the group’s
membership.
The “Shanghai Spirit,” “New Regionalism,” and the Shanghai Co-
operation Organization
The SCO was already a model for a new world order of regional
co-operation on the day of its inauguration, according to Renmin ribao
(People’s Daily), mouthpiece of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP),
and other Chinese newspapers. Thus, “the new model of co-operation
represented by the ‘Shanghai spirit’ (Shanghai jingshen) is a partnership,
and not an alliance. It is an open mechanism not targeted at any third
party. In state-to-state relations, it demands that due respect be paid to the
other side while pursuing one’s own strategic interests. … The ‘Shanghai
spirit’ speaks for mutual respect and seeks commonalities while reserving
differences.”4 At the St Petersburg summit a year later, Jiang extolled the
“Shanghai spirit” as an “important and useful reference” for mutual trust
and co-operation in seeking security, settling disputes by means of
consultation, respecting different civilizations, treating countries equally
regardless of size, and interacting with each other according to the
principle of reciprocal benefit and common prosperity.5 The “Shanghai
spirit” has been summarized by a Chinese academic by means of five C’s:
“confidence, communication, co-operation, coexistence, and common
interest.”6 It has also been praised by another Chinese academic as a
2. Renmin ribao (People’s Daily) (Beijing), 16 June 2001; Xinhua Monthly (Beijing), 31
December 2001.
3. Ma Ying, Quyu zhuyi yu fazhanzhong guojia (Regionalism and Developing Countries)
(Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 2002), p. 216.
4. Renmin ribao (Beijing), 15 June 2001. Translation mine.
5. Renmin ribao (Beijing), 8 June 2002. Translation mine.
6. Professor Lu Zhongwei, President of the China Institute of Contemporary International
Relations in Beijing, China, as quoted in Xu Tao, “On the SCO under new situation,”
Contemporary International Relations, Vol.12, No. 6 (June 2002), p. 23.
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powerful force that “confronts ‘hegemonism’ and ‘power politics,’
respects the right of states to develop their politics, economics and
society in the own way, opposes the use of humanitarian or human right
excuses to interfere in states’ internal affairs, and supports the solidarity
of SCO member states in their struggle to build a new ‘multi-polar’
international political and economic order.”7 Indeed, enthusiasts may
even consider the “Shanghai spirit” as the “spiritualization” of China’s
“new security concept,” which made its first appearance in the Chinese
defence white paper of 1998, stating that relations among countries
should be established on the basis of mutual respect for territorial
integrity and sovereignty; mutual non-aggression; non-interference in
each other’s internal affairs; equality and mutual benefit; and peaceful
co-existence.8
In addition to manifesting a “Shanghai spirit,” the Chinese were
confident enough of their sway and opportunities in the SCO to coin
their policy of political, economic and strategic opening towards Central
Asia, “new regionalism” (xin quyu zhuyi). According to some Chinese
academics, the SCO is an ideal example of China’s pursuit of the
co-operative gains of “new regionalism,” through the co-ordination
among member states of security postures to combat separatism, funda-
mentalism and terrorism, and economic policies to promote trade and
investment in each other’s countries.9 In their opinion, the theory and
practice of classical “regionalism” is derived from the experience of
European unity in the decades following the Second World War, and
rested not only on the complementary nature of the economic systems
and political values, but also on the common understanding of the
history, culture and civilization among the countries and peoples of
Western Europe. “New regionalism,” on the other hand, is a product of
the post-Cold War era, built on the foundation of free or freer trade, such
as the Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC) or the ASEAN3
(Association of South-East Asian Nations China, Japan and South
Korea); or embodied as a co-operative forum to deal with security,
economics and changes in the regional environment, like the ASEAN
Regional Forum (ARF) or the SCO. In this view, while “regionalism”
demonstrates a retreat from state sovereignty with the movement towards
federation of the parts of the regional organization, “new regionalism”
seeks to group together countries with different political systems and
cultural and religious traditions chiefly for the purpose of promoting the
7. Ma Ying, Regionalism and Developing Countries, pp. 224–25.
8. Cynics will note that this concept is really nothing new, but a refurbishment of the
so-called “Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence” enunciated by then Premier Zhou Enlai
at the Bandung Conference of Afro-Asian Nations in April 1955.
9. Pang Zhongying, “Shanghai hezuo zuzhi yu xin diqu zhuyi,” (“Shanghai Co-operation
Organization and new regionalism,”) Luntan tongxun (China Reform Forum Newsletter), No.
9 (2002), pp. 9–14; Liu Xiaolin, “ Quyu hezuo zuzhi de xin moxing,” (“The new model of
regional co-operative organizations,”) Luntan tongxun, No. 9 (2002), pp. 15–22; and Zhang
Shengjun, “Shanghai hezuo zuzhi yu 21 shiji woguo zhoubian anquan zhanlu¨e,” (“Shanghai
Co-operation Organization and the 21st century strategic security of our country’s
surrounding regions,”) Luntan tongxun, No. 9 (2002), pp. 22–26.
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interaction of global trade and capital in that region.10 In other words, to
the Chinese, “new regionalism” is open, functional, interest-based co-
operation among contiguous states that is clearly ascendant in Eurasia, as
opposed to the traditional concept of (“old”) regionalism, exemplified by
the European Union, which is closed, identity-based, ideologically but-
tressed by liberal democratic values, and presumably out-dated. Pursuing
“new regionalism” in Central Asia would also ideally group countries of
the SCO into a “pole” in a “multi-polar” world, to undermine what the
Chinese perceive to be American global domination.
Although Chinese writings have lauded the formation of the SCO as a
useful experiment in the search for a new model of state-to-state relations
and comprehensive regional security and co-operation, “new regionalism,”
and the “Shanghai spirit” which nourishes it, may be more accurately
regarded as an attempt by China to uphold the traditional undertaking by
states to respect each other as principal actors in the international arena
while having domestic sovereignty within their own borders. By pushing
these concepts, the Chinese hope to defend against agents of American
“hegemony,” democratization and the inequitable aspects of economic
globalization which threaten to subvert this order. China today perceives
itself, and wants others to perceive it, as both a defender of state
sovereignty and a respected big power in the community of nations. Hence
the two basic tenets of current Chinese foreign policy are: upholding the
principle of non-interference in states’ domestic affairs; and strengthening
the role and effectiveness of the United Nations and its Security Council,
where China enjoys a veto as a permanent member, in regulating
international affairs. The Chinese leadership believes that, for China to
become a powerful country with a strong military, it will have to continue
developing its economy, which requires conditions of external peace and
domestic stability to prevail. As such, notwithstanding some degree of
co-operation over issues like rebuilding Iraq, halting nuclear proliferation
or fighting terrorism, China considers American attempts to establish,
maintain or strengthen strategic alliances with countries in Asia as
potentially threatening to China’s military and economic security. Amer-
icans’ oft-expressed desire to proselytize the virtues of individual rights
and democracy also appears to the Chinese as a form of domestic political
interference that may subvert China’s social stability and its process of
development through undermining the CCP regime’s control of the
country. Of course, it has often been pointed out that these Chinese
sensitivities derive from a long-standing consternation against self-inter-
ested great powers forcing their will upon weaker nations, a perturbation
rooted in China’s recent history of being humiliated into signing “unequal”
treaties with the West and Japan. Whatever the case, Beijing wishes to
counter what it considers to be unilateralist and meddlesome American
actions, and further its own interests at the same time, through promoting
multilateral co-operation and retaining the principle of non-interference
among like-minded states in regional organizations such as the SCO.
10. Ma Ying, Regionalism and Developing Countries, pp. 31–32, quoting Ronald D.
Palmer and Kishore Mabhubani.
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The meeting in 2001 transforming “Shanghai Five” into the SCO was,
in a sense, a culmination of the growing influence of the People’s
Republic of China in Central Asia over the course of the previous decade.
China became a founding member of an organization that joins together
some 1.5 billion people and 60 per cent of the Eurasian landmass, and by
itself, constitutes the bulk of its population and economic size. For
perspective, Central Asians form only 50 million of its population.
Uzbekistan, the Central Asian country most wary of a revival of Russian
influence in the region, was admitted to membership at this time. Russia,
which had been pursuing talks with the United States on reducing
warheads on nuclear missiles, nevertheless went along with the Chinese
in expressing its opposition to the scrapping of the Anti-Ballistic Missiles
(ABM) treaty of 1972. Although it could hardly be of concern to them,
SCO states also took the Chinese lead in opposing any foreign (read: US)
involvement in resolving the Taiwan issue, or the US deployment of a
Theatre Missile Defence (TMD) system in the western Pacific covering
Taiwan. It was also discussed at that meeting that China might in future
be allowed to send troops to Central Asia to combat terrorist threats there,
if requested by regional governments.11 If this comes about, it would be
a significant departure from China’s current foreign policy tenet of not
deploying troops or seeking military bases in foreign countries.
Significantly, the formation of the SCO marked the first time that
China became a member of a formal regional grouping that is not
exclusively economic in orientation, and China took the lead and an
active role in creating and shaping this multilateral organization. Three
days after “9–11,” on 14 September 2001, during the prime ministers’
meeting of SCO member states in Almatay, it was China’s Premier Zhu
Rongji who urged the enactment of the SCO charter and the establish-
ment of an anti-terrorism centre at Bishkek.12 Kazakhstan had hitherto
stressed economic co-operation as the main focus of the SCO, and Russia
had argued that the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) already
has an anti-terrorism co-ordinating body, but both were finally won over
by China’s stance.13 The various institutionalization measures taken at the
St Petersburg summit may be considered attempts by Beijing to re-ener-
gize the SCO, which was left somewhat dazed and numbed by the 11
September attacks, and the speed and quick success of the American
intervention in Afghanistan. The charter’s call to guard against “power
politics” and “unilateralism,” and the SCO’s attempt to turn itself into a
more permanent body, are strongly backed by China. Both moves are
linked to America’s increasingly prominent post-11 September presence
11. Straits Times (Singapore), 21 July 2001.
12. Pan Guang, “Xin xingshi xia de Shanghai hezuo zuzhi: tiaozhan, jiyu he fazhan
qianjing,” (“The Shanghai Co-operation Organization under a new situation: challenges,
opportunities and future developments,”) Guoji wenti yanjiu (Studies of International Issues),
No. 2 (2001), p. 38.
13. Ibid. p. 39.
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in the countries of Central Asia, and China’s desire not to let US
dominance in regional and world affairs remained unchecked. China also
hopes that strengthening the SCO into a multi-national compact will fuse
its own desire to create a “multi-polar” world with Russian President
Vladimir Putin’s wish to prevent a “power vacuum” in Central Asia,
caused by the collapse of the Soviet Union and Russia’s subsequent
withdrawal from the region, from being filled by Islamic insurgents,14 or
for that matter, the Americans.
The governments of Uzbekistan and Tajikistan have for years been
decrying each other for supporting armed terrorist forces aimed at
undermining their own authority. While the Tajik government accused its
Uzbek counterpart of harbouring elements of the United Tajik Opposition
during the civil war in Tajikistan from 1992 to 1997, Uzbekistan dis-
patched troops across the border with Tajikistan to contain armed Islamist
insurgents moving from Afghanistan through Tajikistan into Uzbekistan
to topple its secular regime. Ethnic tension between the majority Kyrgyz
people of Kyrgyzstan and the Uzbek minority in the south of the country
has become a factor affecting its stability. Still, witnessing the violent
activities executed by the multi-national terrorist Islamic Movement of
Uzbekistan (IMU) in the Ferghana Valley where the borders of Uzbek-
istan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan meet, and the religious militancy that
seeped out of Afghanistan’s erstwhile Taliban regime, SCO member
states were concerned enough to put into operation an anti-terrorism
centre at Bishkek in 2001, to gather and share intelligence in the fight
against terrorism. Threats to national sovereignty and challenges to
majority group dominance have also ultimately prompted the regimes in
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan to co-operate with Russia, China
and one another against secessionism. These aspirations had already
enabled Russia and China to win endorsements from the Muslim Central
Asian states not to assist their religious and ethnic brethren in conducting
militant separatist activities in Russia’s Chechnya and China’s Xinjiang.
In the context of the fight against the “three evils” of separatism,
fundamentalism and terrorism, China hopes that the SCO will bolster the
territorial integrity, economic revival and secular nature of the poverty-
stricken, politically authoritarian and ethnically diverse regimes in Cen-
tral Asia that are struggling to curb rising sentiments of Pan-Turkic
nationalism, Islamic extremism and terrorist activities in the region.
China pays particular attention to how Central Asians see the struggle for
Xinjiang independence by its dominant Turkic-speaking Muslim Uighur
nationality, for Central Asia is host to an Uighur diaspora estimated at
about half-a-million,15 with 300,000 of them in Kazakhstan and 50,000 in
Kyrgyzstan.16 A peaceful and stable Central Asia would not only make
14. Sergei Blagov, “Shanghai Co-operation Organization prepares for a new role,” Eurasia
Insight, 30 April 2002.
15. B. Raman, “US & terrorism in Xinjiang,” South Asia Analysis Group, Paper No. 499,
24 July 2002.
16. “Rejoining the Silk Road: North-east and Central Asia exploring new connections,”
AsiaInt, September 2003, p. 1.
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China’s western borders more secure against men, weapons, funds and
propaganda materials crossing into Xinjiang in aid of the separatists’
cause for an independent state of “Eastern Turkestan” or “Uighuristan,”17
their preferred names for Xinjiang. It would also open doors for China’s
domestic economic “Open Up the West” (xibu da kaifa) strategy by
promoting trade and investment between Central Asia and western China,
where Beijing has pumped more than US$55 billion into infrastructure
building, ecological projects and education programmes,18 with US$12
billion to be spent on railway construction alone from 2001 to 2005.19
These two national priorities – maintaining border security and develop-
ing the western region – harmonize with the intent of the early 21st
century Chinese leadership to maintain the legitimacy of CCP rule by
boosting China’s global stature, economic gains and social order. China’s
burgeoning diplomatic, economic and strategic influence over the region
through the SCO may be eroded by an intensifying and semi-permanent
US military build-up in Central Asia.
Chinese Opposition to the US Military Presence in Central Asia: Three
Reasons
When the United States announced that it was pursuing the military
option against the Taliban government of Afghanistan for harbouring the
masterminds behind the attacks of 11 September 2001, the Central Asian
member states of the SCO, themselves troubled by religious insurgencies
for years, were quick to demonstrate their support for the American
cause. Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan allowed more than 3,000 American
and allied troops to be deployed at the air bases of Khanabad and Manas,
near Bishkek, respectively, following discussions in January 2002 with
General Tommy Franks, head of the US Central Command responsible
for Afghanistan; while a visit from US Secretary of State Donald
Rumsfeld persuaded Kazakhstan and Tajikistan to let the United States
use their airspace for military over-flight.20 Subsequently, in April 2002,
the Kazakh authorities allowed the US military to use three of its airports
at Almaty, Chimkent and Jambyl. The IMU has reportedly regrouped in
the Ferghana Valley since 2002, where they were quite active before
shifting the locus of their activities to Afghanistan in 1999 to be with
their Taliban allies,21 and another terrorist group, the Hizb-ut-Tahrir, still
17. According to a statement released by the People’s Republic of China State Council
Information Office on 21 January 2002, Uighur separatists were responsible for 200 terrorist
incidents in Xinjiang from 1990 to 2001, causing 162 deaths and more than 440 people injured.
18. Jason Leow, “Beijing pumps $55b. into western region,” Straits Times (Singapore),
13 November 2002.
19. Shai Oster, “Rail link a mixed bag for China’s Uighurs,” Christian Science Monitor,
4 February 2001.
20. Chen Lianbi, “San ge ‘jiduan zhuyi’ yu zhongYa anquan,” (“Three ‘extremisms’ and
Central Asian security,”) Dong’Ou zhongYa yanjiu (Eastern European and Central Asian
Studies), No. 5 (2002).
21. Gao Qiufu, “Terrorist forces resurge in Central Asia,” Beijing Review, 22 August 2002,
p. 8.
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harbours the vision of establishing an Islamic Caliphate in Central Asia.
The Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) signed between Kyrgyzstan
and the United States on 15 February 2002 could be seen as providing
official cover for the American military presence in the country. Like-
wise, the US–Uzbekistan joint declaration of 12 March 2002, on a
“Strategic Partnership and Co-operation Framework” read, in part, that
the United States “affirms that it would regard with grave concern any
external threat to the security and territorial integrity of Uzbekistan.”22
For access to Khanabad and logistical facilities at the Uzbek side of the
border with Afghanistan, the United States provided annual aid of
US$160 million to Uzbekistan,23 with US$43 million in military aid alone
in 2002.24 Washington also provided Tajikistan with US$125 million in
aid for 2002.25 The British government, on the other hand, furnished
US$20 million worth of assistance to Kyrgyzstan in that year.26
Considering China’s ardent stance in fighting religion-inspired terror-
ism, it could be assumed that the Chinese government would welcome the
post-11 September US military involvements in the territories of its SCO
neighbours. After all, the reason given by the Americans for being there
is to prevent the invidious forces of religious terrorism from seeping
through to Central Asia from Afghanistan and fuelling the militant
insurgencies of the region. However, China has made known its dis-
comfort with a direct American presence in Central Asia. It is widely
recognized that the principal purpose of the SCO for China is to skew the
political preferences of Central Asian governments towards friendship
with China and reliance on Russia by means of economic development
and security co-operation. Furthermore, for a country that shares a long
3,300 kilometre border with three Central Asian republics that are in
many places mountainous and difficult to patrol, China’s major concern
for the region is to ensure its stability, so as better to guarantee the
security and interests of its own troubled western frontiers. As such,
China considers the American presence in Central Asia as an attempt to
use the fight against terrorism to bolster its own influence in the region
at the expense of China, Russia and Iran. The United States took
practically no notice of the SCO in its bilateral negotiations with Central
Asian states to enlist their co-operation in the war against Afghanistan.
During Jiang Zemin’s April 2002 visit to Iran, a country that Washington
considers part of an “axis of evil,” the Chinese President openly opposed
American troop deployment in Central Asia as a manifestation of US
22. Charles Fairbanks, “Bases of debate – America in Central Asia: being there,” National
Interest, Summer 2002, p. 40.
23. Sally Buzbee, “United States expanded influence likely to remain in Central Asia,”
Associated Press, 12 March 2002.
24. Kaiser, “US cultivates unlikely allies in Central Asia.”
25. Ahmed Rashid, “Trouble ahead,” Far Eastern Economic Review, 9 May 2002, p. 18.
26. Yu Xuehui and Xu Tao, “Meiguo junshi liliang jinru zhongYa jiqi yingxiang,”
(“American military might entering Central Asia and its implications,”) Dong’Ou zhongYa
yanjiu (Eastern European and Central Asian Studies), No. 3 (2002), p. 41.
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hegemony.27 While calling on member states to combat terrorism and
other cross-border crimes, the SCO charter added that laws and principles
pertaining to the fight against terrorism must not be used as excuses to
violate the sovereignty of other states or interfere in their internal
affairs,28 in what can only be read as a warning to the United States.
Beijing expressed its unhappiness because it has three major reasons for
wanting to exclude, or at least minimize, American influence in Central
Asia, related to the preservation of China’s geo-political, geo-economic
and geo-strategic importance in the region, through the SCO.
Preservation of China’s geo-political influence. First, the SCO was
envisaged as a politico-security bulwark against the eastward expansion
of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) into Central Asia,
carried out chiefly through US military aid to regional governments and
training programmes with their armed forces, which China and Russia
feared would have worked against their geo-political interests as great
powers bordering the region. In 1994, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzs-
tan and Turkmenistan joined the NATO “Partnership for Peace” pro-
gramme, and in 1995, under American aegis, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and
Kazakhstan formed the Central Asian Battalion (Centrazbat), ostensibly
for regional peace-keeping purposes. Since 1996, these three countries
have also conducted annual military manoeuvres with American forces,
including paratroopers from the elite US 82nd Airborne. With a strong
American ally in their midst, and Russia now a full NATO partner with
the Putin government providing unquestioning political support for the
regional status quo, Central Asian states will have less need to accommo-
date Chinese demands than before, or use China to balance Russia to gain
a greater degree of independence. The authoritarian regimes of Central
Asia might have had some concerns in the past when aid from the United
States usually came with an earful of criticisms on their lack of human
rights and democracy, but changes in American priorities since 11
September 2001 have led to less conditional support for these repressive
governments, in the cause of suppressing radical Islam and ensuring
stability in the region. Against American and Western generosity to the
region’s governments in the last two years, however, China could only
come up with a token 8 million RMB, or about US$970 000 of military
aid to Kyrgyzstan in 2001.29
Analysts believe that the stationing of American troops on Uzbek
territory and the approval of US$400 million of loans from the United
States and the World Bank in March 2002, ostensibly to help Uzbekistan
combat terrorism, nuclear proliferation and drug trafficking, offer clear
indications that the US intends to support the country as its “anchor state”
to serve American interests in Central Asia, even if it means playing to
27. Willy Wo-lap Lam, “China opposes US presence in Central Asia,” CNN.com, 22 April
2002, http://www.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/asiapcf/east/04/22/china.iran/index.html.
28. Renmin ribao (Beijing), 8 June 2001.
29. “Shanghai Five expands to combat Islamic radicals,” Jane’s Terrorism and Security
Monitor, 1 July 2002.
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Uzbekistan’s hegemonic pretensions.30 Already, it seems that Uzbekistan
is encouraged enough by the American presence that it missed both an
emergency SCO meeting in October 2001 to discuss the pending Ameri-
can attack on Afghanistan, and a meeting of SCO defence ministers in
Moscow in May 2002 to discuss the possibility of holding joint anti-ter-
rorist operations in the future. As a result, the meetings failed to arrive at
any concrete measures for military co-operation, despite Chinese insist-
ence. At the meeting of SCO heads of government in September 2003,
Uzbekistan even managed to have the organization’s anti-terrorism centre
relocated from Kyrgyzstan’s Bishkek to its own capital, Tashkent.
Concerned about rising incidents of ethnic rioting, political assassina-
tions, bus bombings, arson, and sabotaging of oil-wells and pipelines in
Xinjiang, Beijing has been pressing Central Asian governments since the
early 1990s to assist in efforts to identify groups and leaders of Uighur
separatists residing among the diaspora in their countries, and cut off
funding and shelter for them. Some of the small, dispersed but better
known Uighur separatist groups operating in Central Asian states include
the “Nozugum” Foundation, Kazakhstan Regional Uyghur Organization,
Kazakh Uyghur Unity (Ittipak) Association, Uyghuristan Freedom As-
sociation, Uyghur Youth Union, Uighurstan Liberation Organization, and
United Revolutionary Front of Eastern Turkestan headed by Yusupbek
Mukhlisi, all based in Kazakhstan’s Almatay; and the Kyrgyz Uyghur
Unity (Ittipak) Association and Bishkek Human Rights Centre, both
based in Kyrgyzstan’s Bishkek.31 It would be a mistake to believe that all
these groups pursue violence; indeed, most can only be accused of
producing and distributing writings, cassettes or videotapes advocating
the Uighur cause. Only Mukhlisi’s group has claimed credit for a series
of bomb blasts in Urumqi and Beijing in 1997, and raids on the Chinese
military’s arms depots in Xinjiang.32 Still, under strong pressure from
Beijing, the governments of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan have shut down
Uighur political parties and newspapers operating in their countries. It is
perhaps not surprising that, according to a nation-wide poll conducted in
Kazakhstan by a Russian newspaper in 1998, only 9.4 per cent of
Kazakhs supported the development of good relations with China.33
30. Shahram Akbarzadeh, “Tashkent caught between the United States and the Shanghai
Co-operation Organization,” SAIS Central Asia – Caucasus Analyst, 5 June 2002,
http://www.cacianalyst.org/2002–06–05/20020522 UZBEKISTAN US SCO.htm. See
also Pauline Jones Luong and Erika Weinthal, “New friends, new fears in Central Asia,”
Foreign Affairs, Vol. 81, No. 2, p. 70; Boris Rumer, “The powers in Central Asia,” Survival,
Vol. 44, No. 3 (Autumn 2002), pp. 64–65; and William D. Singleton and John McConnell,
“From Tamerlane to terrorism: the shifting basis of Uzbek foreign policy, “ Harvard Asia
Quarterly, http://www.fas.harvar … / asiatr/haq/200101/0101a004.htm.
31. Uyghur American Association, http://www.uyghuramerican.org/; East Turkestan
Information Center, http://www.uygur.org/adres/uygur/organization.htm; and Michael Sheri-
dan, “China hides its Muslim separatist war,” The Times (London) 10 December 2000.
32. Jeremy Bransten, “Kazakhstan: exiled Uighurs step up fight against Beijing,” Radio
Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 14 October 1997, http://www.rferl.org/nca/features/1997/10/
F.RU.971014135113.html.
33. Deng Hao, “Zhongguo yu zhongYa guojia guanxi: huimou yu qianzhan,” (“China’s
relations with Central Asian countries: past and future,”) in Li Yu and Lu Ting’en (eds.),
https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0305741004000712
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. Open University Libraryy, on 05 Jan 2017 at 20:11:54, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at
1000 The China Quarterly
Notwithstanding the desire of Central Asia’s political leadership to
maintain beneficial ties with China, many people in the region have a
place in their hearts for the secessionist struggles of their ethnic and
religious kin in Xinjiang. China’s crackdown on Uighur militants suppos-
edly linked to Osama bin Laden’s Al-Qaeda terrorist network in the
aftermath of the 11 September attacks drew continuous criticism from the
mass media in Kazakhstan.34 The Uighur service of Radio Free Asia,
which has been funded by the American government since its creation by
Washington in 1994, still broadcasts regularly to Xinjiang from transmit-
ters in Tajikistan and Kazakhstan, often criticizing China’s treatment of
Uighur dissidents in Xinjiang.35 One of the most organized and radical
separatist groups, the “Home of East Turkestan Youth,” also known as
“Xinjiang’s Hamas,” reportedly has 2,000 fighters operating along the
borders of Xinjiang with Tajikistan and Kazakhstan.36 Beijing has also
expressed concerned over the apparent failure of the authorities in
Kyrgyzstan to act effectively against Uighur activists on Kyrgyz territory.
In 1998, Uighurs in Kyrgyzstan staged a protest demonstration outside
the Chinese embassy in Bishkek. In May 2002, thousands of demonstra-
tors fought with police in the Jalal-Abad region and blocked the only
highway between Bishkek and the major southern city of Osh to protest
against the transfer of territory to China under an existing border agree-
ment. In June 2002, a Chinese diplomat was assassinated in the Kyrgyz
capital, two years after two other visiting Chinese officials were similarly
killed. According to the Kyrgyz Interior Ministry, the murders were
linked to local members of a Uighur separatist movement called the
Eastern Turkestan Liberation Front.37
Preservation of China’s geo-economic interests. Secondly, one of the
unstated purposes of the SCO was to function as a Sino-Russian condo-
minium to safeguard both Chinese and Russian economic interests in
Central Asia, a region with abundant natural resources such as cotton,
aluminium, gold and particularly oil and natural gas. By exploring the
possibilities for energy co-operation with Central Asian states, China is
seeking to diversify its sources of crude oil imports away from the
volatile Middle East, and thus reduce its reliance on American goodwill
and American guarantee of the security of the sea-lanes from the Persian
Gulf to the Malacca Straits. In addition, Central Asia has the potential for
footnote continued
Zhongguo yu zhoubian jiuyiyi hou de guoji jushi (China and its Neighbours in the post “9–11”
International Situation) (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 2002), pp. 235–36.
34. Mark Berniker, “China’s Uighur policy draws critics in Kazakhstan,” Eurasianet.org,
29 January 2002, http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/rights/articles/eav012902.shtml.
35. Dru C. Gladney, “China’s minorities: the case of Xinjiang and the Uyghur people,”
unpublished paper.
36. Sean L. Yom, “Uighurs flex their muscles,” Asia Times (Taiwan), 23 January 2003,
http://www.atimes.com/china/DA23Ad01.html.
37. Nadia Usaeva,, “Kyrgyzstan: trial focuses attention on possible Uighur Repression,”
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 31 August 2001, http://www.rferl.com/nca/features/2001/
08/31082001115924.asp.
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satisfying China’s need for energy resources in its rapid economic
development and consumption of oil and natural gas. According to an
industrial survey in 1999, Kazakhstan alone possesses reserves of 739
million tons of crude oil and 1839.5 billion cubic metres of natural gas,
while Tukmenistan, not an SCO member-state, has natural gas reserves of
2858.3 billion cubic metres.38 China became a net importer of crude oil
in 1993. In 2000, compared to China’s production volume of 200 million
tons,39 the country’s crude oil import reached 60 million tons, and the
import figure is expected to increase to 120 million tons in 2010 and 240
million tons in 2020.40
In 1997, Beijing’s state-owned China National Petroleum Corporation
(CNPC) first acquired shares and development rights to 60 per cent of
Kazakhstan’s Atyubinsk oil field, and then outbid its American rival
Amoco for the country’s largest oil field at Uzen.41 CNPC reportedly won
the Uzen bid because the Kazakh government was attracted by its
attendant proposal to construct a pipeline from the oil field across
Kazakhstan, Xinjiang and northern China to the port of Lianyungang on
the Chinese coast.42 China is particularly keen to keep an eye on
American oil interests bidding for concessions from Kazakhstan and
other Central Asian governments to sink wells or lay oil and gas pipelines
from the region. Beijing wants to make sure CNPC retains its attraction
for Central Asian governments in negotiating future concessions, at the
expense of its private but politically well-connected American rivals,
such as Chevron or Texaco, which had been remarkably successful in
concluding hydrocarbon deals with Kazakhstan. In March 2001, Kazakh
President Nursultan Nazarbayev expressed willingness to export his
country’s oil in future through a proposed pipeline under the Caspian Sea
and across Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey to the Turkish port of
Ceyhan,43 which is to be constructed with financing arranged by the US
government. It will be a powerful boost for American economic influence
in Central Asia at the expense of the Russians and the Chinese, if the US
is able to reroute Kazakh oil from its existing pipeline system ending at
the Russian port of Novorossisk to Ceyhan, and persuade Kazakhstan not
to participate any further in the pipeline project to China. Although trade
38. Zhang Zhenguo and Liao Qinian, “ ‘9–11’ shijian dui Mei-E zhengdou zhongYa taishi
de yingxiang” (“The ‘9–11’ incident and the situation and influence of US–Russian rivalry
in Central Asia”) in Li and Lu, China and its Neighbours, p. 358.
39. Wang Chuanqian, “Quanmian renshi ge jieduan Xinjiang jingji fazhan de tezheng,”
(“Completely comprehend the various stages of the characteristics of economic development
in Xinjiang”) Xinjiang shehui kexue (Xinjiang Social Sciences), No. 4 (2002), p. 17.
40. Centre for Ethnic and Religious Studies, China Institute of Contemporary International
Relations, Shanghai hezuo zuzhi – xin anquan guan yu xin jizhi (Shanghai Co-operation
Organization – New Security Concepts and New Mechanisms) (Beijing: Shishi chubanshe,
2001), p. 41.
41. Zhang Zhenguo, “Tan woguo dui zhongYa wu guo de waijiao zhengce,” (“Discussing
our country’s foreign policy towards the five Central Asian states,”) in Li and Lu, China and
its Neighbours, p. 252.
42. Birgit Brauer, “China loses out in Central Asia,” Transatlantic International Politik,
Vol. 3 (2002), p. 83.
43. BBC News, “World: Asia-Pacific Kazakh president in Turkey,” 15 June 1998,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/112572.stm.
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between China and Kazakhstan exceeded US$1.5 billion in 2001, the
project to construct a US$9.5 billion, 3,000-kilometre pipeline from
CNPC’s Kazakh oilfields to China is put on hold, as the Kazakh
government has been unwilling to guarantee an annual minimum volume
of 20 million tons of crude for this long and costly pipeline.44
As early as 1994, aware that Central Asia constitutes a potentially
important export market for products from Xinjiang and other parts of
China, then Chinese Premier Li Peng espoused the need to revive the
ancient commercial “Silk Road” running through Central Asia from
Europe to China.45 This was to be done through a proposed network of
roads and railways, to rival a similar project backed by Western countries
to link Central Asia with Europe called TRACECA (Transport Corridor
Europe Caucasus Asia).46 In 2002, Xinjiang’s border trade with Kaza-
khstan and Kyrgyzstan amounted to US$1.57 billion or 57 per cent of its
total trade volume, and China became the third biggest trading partner for
both countries.47 However, the economic benefits of trading with China
seem to have so far accrued more favourably to China than to the Central
Asian countries, considering the differential terms of trade between
China’s export of consumer durables, foodstuffs, fertilizers, electric
appliances and machines to the region, and its imports of mineral,
agricultural and animal products from there. Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan
have so far failed to prevent the illegal smuggling of consumer goods
from China, which have led to a thriving black market across Central
Asia, and the Chinese authorities have offered little tangible help. The
inherent volatility in world oil prices and their recovery since hitting a
low in 1998 have only made regional governments more impatient to
attract more trade and investment from the West, as well as additional
loans and credits to develop their natural resources, especially energy. By
the end of 1997, American and Western companies already had control of
more than 30 major energy, gold and metallurgical works in Kazakhstan,
comprising 70 per cent of the country’s national output.48 American
companies are now collectively the largest provider of foreign investment
in Central Asia. Hence China has reason to worry that its efforts to
augment its own economic influence in Central Asia will be greatly
compromised by the renewed US interest in the region.
Preservation of China’s geo-strategic interests. Thirdly, a major pur-
pose of the SCO was to ensure peace and stability on China’s western
frontiers, so as to minimize external disturbances to the domestic order of
44. Birgit Brauer, “China loses out in Central Asia,” p. 83. Amy Myers Jaffe and Steven
W. Lewis, “Beijing’s oil diplomacy,” Survival, Vol. 44, No. 1 (Spring 2002), p. 125.
45. Renmin ribao (Beijing), 20 April 1994.
46. Jyotsna Bakshi, “Shanghai Co-operation Organization (SCO) before and after
September 11,” Strategic Analysis, Vol. 26, No. 2 (April–June 2002), p. 270.
47. “Rejoining the Silk Road: North-east and Central Asia exploring new connections,”
AsiaInt, September 2003, p. 6.
48. Deng Hao, “Mei-E zai zhongYa zhengdou de xinjushi,” (“The new situation of
US–Russian rivalry in Central Asia,”) Guoji wenti yanjiu (Studies of International Issues),
No. 2 (2001).
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Xinjiang which might have dampened the confidence and flow of in-
vestors and tourists to the region. By maintaining a military presence on
China’s western flank, even after the end of the war in Afghanistan, the
United States is putting itself in a very advantageous position for any
future strategic bargaining with China. Facing a severe crackdown on
terrorist activities by the Chinese government in the last two years, many
separatists in Xinjiang who escaped arrest for organizing riots, bombings
and political assassinations have adopted non-violent means to continue
their struggle,49 but some have fled to Afghanistan to join the al-Qaeda,
sought refuge in Muslim religious schools (Madrassas) in Pakistan, or
surfaced in Central Asia to train with the extremist anti-government
groups there. Beijing knows that, if US–China relations are kept on an
even keel, Washington can help the Chinese government gather intelli-
gence on the Xinjiang separatist cells operating in Central Asia. The
United States may even mop up these cells for Beijing and extradite the
activists to China, as the Kazakh government has been doing for a few
years. However, the Chinese also realizes that, should the United States
perceive China as a threat to its strategic interests, such as in mobilizing
for an attack on Taiwan, it will be much more possible now for
Washington to put military pressure on Beijing from Central Asia. At the
very least, the US will have enough clout with the governments of
Central Asia to discourage them from cracking down on Uighur sepa-
ratists seeking arms, training and sanctuary in the region before these
elements slip back across the border into Xinjiang. Since the American
invasion of Afghanistan in October 2001, and even with the collapse of
the Taliban regime, China has not withdrawn its military forces along the
border with Afghanistan, or adjacent Tajikistan and Pakistan-held Kash-
mir.
A close reading of the Pentagon’s “Quadrennial defense review report
2001,” released just after the 11 September events, and the “2002 annual
report on the military power of the People’s Republic of China,” reveals
that the US military was devising a long-term strategy based on the
expectation that the next threat to global American security interests
would be China, given its arms acquisition and military modernization
programme. Despite the troubles with Islamic terrorism and Iraq, there
are still adherents to this view within the US administration and defence
establishment. Since China maintains excellent relations with Iran, which
is no friend of America, an additional advantage to the United States of
having troops in Central Asia is to break any possible future Iran–China
strategic axis running through the region, particularly if Iran, believed to
be enriching uranium for reactor fuel, proceeds with developing nuclear
weapons.50 American troop strength in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan is
likely to rise in the future. The United States is also expected to expand
49. Interview with Professor Xu Tao, Research Fellow at the China Institute of
Contemporary International Relations, Beijing, 10 December 2002.
50. Joseph Cirincione and Husain Haqqani, “The Asian nuclear arc,” Los Angeles Times,
28 September 2003. Iran’s nuclear energy programme was a beneficiary of Chinese assistance
in its early stages, although that aid had since been suspended under US pressure. See Robert
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the Manas air base in Kyrgyzstan, on a 20-year lease and only 320
kilometres from the Chinese border, into a major base of support for air
operations and the hub of a regional electronic intelligence network
which covers western China.51 China’s push for a nuclear weapons-free
zone in Central Asia during the second SCO summit reflects its anxiety
that the United States, which has yet to endorse this vision, or some other
power, may in future introduce tactical nuclear weapons into the region.
Hence, Beijing is unwilling to dismantle its nuclear weapons test site at
Xinjiang’s Lop Nor, nor would it allow Xinjiang to be included in such
a proposed zone.
China’s Relations with “Post 9–11” United States and Russia in NATO
Since the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the strategic
relationship between China and the United States against the Soviet
Union, the Chinese leadership has been searching for a stable and
long-term basis of official co-operation with Washington. Beijing has
always realized that China’s most important state-to-state relationship is
with the world’s sole superpower, and that, despite negative feelings on
the American role in Central Asia, taking concrete measures to support
the United States’ fight against global terrorism after the 11 September
events can be a means of drawing itself closer to Washington. Accord-
ingly, the Chinese government in late 2001 approved the establishment of
a Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Legal Attache´ in Beijing and, at
the request of the United States, conducted a search among banks in
China and Hong Kong for possible funding for terrorist groups. The
Chinese authorities also enacted new regulations to assert direct control
and supervision over companies exporting missiles and related technol-
ogy by the State Council. In return, the United States finally classified the
East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) as a terrorist organization,
effectively reversing President George W. Bush’s earlier position that
China’s counter-terrorism campaign should not be used “as an excuse to
persecute minorities” opposed to Chinese rule in Xinjiang.52 Hence the
quid pro quo may be considered a concession on China’s part to
American power and priorities, in exchange for Washington’s implicit
blessing of Beijing’s suppression of separatist activities in Xinjiang.
The basis of co-operation between China and the United States in the
post-11 September period has been described by some Chinese analysts
as resting on the three pillars of “anti-terrorism, anti-proliferation and
footnote continued
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51. New York Times, 9 January 2002.
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anti-recession.”53 In that case, if the US again disregards China’s objec-
tion in attacking a sovereign country as it did with Iraq to oust Saddam
Hussein, or charges the Chinese government with conniving in the sale of
missile-related technology to enemies of the US, or accuses Beijing of
contravening provisions of the World Trade Organization on economic
liberalization or other issues, will these three pillars hold? Or is China
likely to remain the once and future “strategic competitor” for the United
States, as their bilateral relationship was characterized by the Bush
administration in its early months? Although China has shared intelli-
gence with the United States on terrorist organizations in Central Asia,
the principal benefit of Chinese support to the United States on its wars
in Afghanistan and Iraq was China’s sympathetic diplomatic stance in the
United Nations, and little more. Although fighting global terrorism is
certainly a plank of co-operation at present, in the final analysis, the war
on terror is a peripheral issue in Sino-American relations. China and the
United States have somewhat different ideas on how to deal with Japan’s
future strategic role in Asia, the Taiwan issue, tensions on the Korean
peninsula, American deployment of the TMD, China’s growing presence
on the world stage, and concerns pertaining to the human rights situation
in China. Chinese assent to the American-led campaign against terrorism
diverts attention from bilateral disagreements, but does not solve them.
The Chinese will recall that Central Asian states offered no public
support or sympathy to China when its embassy in Belgrade was bombed
in 1999 by the US during NATO’s campaign against Yugoslavia.54 With
American forces in Central Asia, China would be wise not to count on
any automatic support from regional states in the event of a discord or
conflict with the US, and may have to be reconciled to a more constrained
role in the SCO.
Although relations with Russia for the past decade have been stable
and continue to be important, as Moscow remains the chief arms supplier
to the Chinese People’s Liberation Army, it is doubtful whether China
will be able to further its co-operation with Russia to develop the SCO
into a platform opposing “unilateralism” or “power politics.” An older
generation of “Eurasianists” in Moscow who want Russia to be the
dominant country of Eurasia is giving way to a younger cohort of more
internationalist and Western-oriented “Atlanticists,” who are more envi-
ous of China’s economic success and concerned about its potential for
holding Russia’s foreign policy hostage because of Beijing’s valuable
arms acquisitions from Moscow.55 China and Russia had forged what
they described as a “strategic partnership” in 1996, under Putin’s prede-
53. These three supposed pillars of current Sino-American co-operation were suggested
to me by several scholars at the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations in
Beijing and the Shanghai Institute of International Studies during my interviews with them
in July 2002.
54. Sun Zhuangzhi, ZhongYa xin geju yu diqu anquan (Central Asia’s New Chessboard
and Regional Security) (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe. 2001), p. 274.
55. Conversation with Dr Yevgeny Volk, Co-ordinator of the Moscow Office of the
Heritage Foundation, on 6 January 2003.
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cessor as Russian President, Boris Yeltsin, subsequently formalized as the
Sino-Russian Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Good Neighbourly
Relations, in July 2001. Since then, developments in Sino-Russian rela-
tions have not kept pace with those between Russia and the United States,
and Beijing has been put on the defensive by Moscow’s lean towards the
West and acceptance of the American presence in Central Asia.56 This is
also perhaps because Russia has maintained 20,000 troops in Tajikistan;
formed a 2,000-men anti-terrorist Collective Rapid Reaction Force
(CRRF) in August 2001, under the aegis of the CIS Collective Security
Treaty, which groups Russia with Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and
Tajikistan; and opened an airbase at Kant, only 20 kilometres east of
Bishkek in Kyrgyzstan, in October 2003. Unlike China, Russia does not
need an SCO cover to deploy troops in, or conduct military exercises
with, Central Asian affiliates of the CIS.
During the past two years, accords such as the US–Russia Treaty on
Reductions of Strategic Offensive Weapons, the Joint Declaration on a
New Strategic Relationship between the US and Russia, Russia’s partner-
ship status with NATO through the NATO–Russia Joint Council, and its
reconciliation to NATO expansion, have alerted the Chinese to a new and
improved relationship between the United States and Russia. In addition
the United States is now discussing with its NATO partners, including
Russia, further military engagement involving the alliance in Central Asia
and Afghanistan. Thus, to retain a say in Central Asian affairs, China
requested a formal bilateral dialogue with NATO at its enlargement
meeting in November 2002, to discuss strategic perceptions, shared
security threats and NATO activities in Central Asia. This is the clearest
indication that Beijing has finally come to regard Russia’s engagement
with the Western military alliance as both durable and serious, and that
it can no longer rely on Russia to act as a buffer against NATO. Although
the leadership of China, and to a lesser extent Russia, will continue to use
the rhetoric of constructing a multi-polar world order, they recognize that
the Bush administration is unwilling to shift American foreign policy to
a more multi-lateral platform, especially over to what it considers to be
core US national interest. Bilateral relations between China and Russia
are expected to remain peaceful and predictable, but for the foreseeable
future, the two states will continue separately to view and pursue better
political and economic relations with the United States as their most
important foreign policy objective and strategy for trade development,
capital investment and technological transfer.
Future of the SCO and China’s Uncertain Role and Influence in Central
Asia
So where is the SCO headed? Centrifugal tendencies threatening to
break it apart will always be present, as there is no pooling of state
56. Vasily Bubnov, “Shanghai Co-operation Organization: what is it for?” Pravda On-line,
7 June 2002, http://english.pravda.ru/main/2002/06/07/29950.html.
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sovereignties or a common enemy threatening enough to thwart manifes-
tations of divergent national interests in the group. However, for the
foreseeable future, the SCO is likely to retain its organizational coher-
ence, not so much because it now has a charter, a secretariat and a
secretary general, but because it is in a way every member state’s best
fallback foreign policy position. The grouping is of greatest interest to
China, not only as a vehicle to extend its influence into Central Asia but
also to cope with the rising influence of the US in the region as best as
it can, in tandem with Russia, if at all possible. Uzbekistan, with the
economic and population size of the rest of the Central Asian states
combined, wants to balance China and Russia through participating in the
SCO and attracting American aid and military presence. The other
Central Asian states perceive their membership as a guarantee of protec-
tion from the aims and activities of Islamic radical groups, as well as the
hegemonic aspirations of Uzbekistan, by involving China as an economic
locomotive and Russia as a security guarantor. Although the SCO may
cease to have any useful role for Russia in keeping American influence
out of Central Asia, its continuing membership in the organization still
serves to limit Chinese influence in the area, while nurturing a co-operat-
ive partnership with China, in case relations with the United States and
the West take an unexpected turn for the worse. Of course, all members
of the organization are keeping a watchful eye on the activities of groups
in Central Asia and the adjacent parts of China and Russia seeking to
promote terrorism, fundamentalism and separatism, which is the main
agenda that they can all unreservedly agree to, at least for now.
As an essentially Muslim region of Turkic and Persian speakers, with
an overlay of Russian influence, the cultural attraction of China’s Han
Chinese majority will remain insignificant for the people of Central Asia.
Although joint border patrols with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajik-
istan to catch elements of the “three evils” are entirely conceivable, joint
military exercises conducted by NATO or the Centrazbat states in Central
Asia are unlikely to welcome China. To add weight and significance to
the SCO, China might consider sponsoring Iran, Mongolia and a recon-
structed Afghanistan, countries that are friendly to both China and Russia,
for membership in the organization. However, these countries may not be
prepared to join the club in the near term for their own reasons, just as
the Central Asian state of Turkmenistan has so far declined membership
by citing its desire to remain a neutral country. Inviting Pakistan and
India into the SCO would import their dispute over Kashmir into the
grouping, and India’s entry would also weaken China’s influence within
the organization. If China intends to remain a prominent player in Central
Asia, it will have to be through the broadening and deepening of its
economic linkages with the region.
For China to help Central Asian countries recover their economies to
the levels of before the Soviet collapse, and at the same time allay fears
that it intends to dominate the region economically, the best way may be
to offer more new loans and credits to regional governments, open more
markets at preferential rates to Central Asian products and encourage
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more Chinese investments in the region. Although trade between China
and the five countries of Central Asia has quadrupled over the last ten
years, it is still less than US$2 billion,57 which, when compared to
China’s present overall turnover of trade of more than US$500 billion a
year, is insignificant and leaves much room for expansion. Arbitrary
levies, legal opaqueness and inadequate infrastructure are the most per-
sistent complains by Chinese businessmen in the region.58 During the
June 2002 St Petersburg summit, Kazakhstan’s Nazarbayev moved to
hold consultations on a common tariff policy for all SCO states,59 and
Kyrgyz President Askar Akayev called for the removal of trade barriers
and discriminatory trade policies among the group’s members.60 Al-
though it is probably too early to talk about adopting free-trade policies
among members, as was suggested at the first meeting of the group’s
economic and trade ministers in Shanghai in May 2002,61 China can still
push for the reduction of tariffs, harmonization of foreign investment
codes and standardization of product export quality among SCO coun-
tries. Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan are already
members of the Central Asian Economic Community (CAEC), which has
served as a co-ordinating mechanism for reaching co-operative agree-
ments on the sharing of riparian water resources, energy development,
cross-border trade regulation and techniques of food production, among
other issues. Areas where China can be of particular assistance to the
CAEC states are the provision of much-needed infrastructure aid and
technical expertise, especially for the construction of roads and railways,
development of telecommunications facilities, and the operation of light
industries.
Having a charter and a functioning secretariat may do much to
institutionalize the SCO. However, as a vehicle to extend Chinese
influence beyond its western borders in Central Asia, the SCO and its
supporting concept of “new regionalism” has encountered roadblocks, in
the form of an expanding American military presence and influence, and
a possible resurgence in Russian security interest in the region. Fearing a
rekindling of activities by the Hizb-ut-Tahrir and other Islamic terrorist
groups in the Ferghana Valley, states in the region have begun to rely on
the presence of American forces to guarantee the security and stability of
their regimes. That China has been the dominant force in the SCO until
recently is due in no small measure to the absence of a direct American
presence in the member states, but this is no longer the case. As pointed
out by a former US National Security Advisor, America fully expects to
57. Pan Guang, “China–Central Asia–Russia relations and the role of SCO in the war on
terrorism,” SIIS (Shanghai Institute of International Studies) Journal, Vol. 9, No. 2 (May
2002), p. 15.
58. Sun Zhuangzhi, Central Asia’s New Chessboard, p. 228.
59. Antoine Blua and Bruce Pannier, “Russia: Shanghai group aims to increase economic
co-operation,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 12 June 2002, http://www.rferl.org/nca/fea-
tures/2002/06/12062002134601.asp.
60. Pravda (Moscow), 7 June 2002.
61. China Daily (Beijing), 29 May 2002.
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be the “ultimate arbiter” of Central Asian affairs in the future.62 With the
Russian air force back in Central Asia together with the CRRF, and
consequently less desire on the part of Moscow to use the SCO as a hedge
against Washington’s reach in Central Asia, these roadblocks may prove
to be increasingly difficult for China to surmount. Even then, one should
hesitate to write off China’s role and influence in Central Asia and the
SCO. In October 2002, units from China’s Xinjiang Military District and
Kyrgyzstan conducted a two-day joint military exercise involving several
hundred troops and dozens of armoured personnel carriers and helicopters
aimed at combating cross-border terrorist activities.63 This was China’s
first military exercise with a Central Asian state and member of the SCO,
and thus might be read as China’s way of announcing the first step in its
return to centre-stage in the SCO and Central Asian affairs. This move
could only have been strengthened by China’s participation in the first
SCO anti-terrorism military exercise involving 1,000 soldiers at the
border between Kazakhstan and China in August 2003.64 At the June
2004 SCO summit in Tashkent, China extended US$900 million in cheap
buyer’s credit to the SCO Central Asian states, in yet another step to
restore its weight in the region.
62. Zbgniew Brzezinski, The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic
Imperatives (New York: Basic Books, 1997), pp. 123–24.
63. Xinhua News Agency, 11 October 2002. See also Jing Ban, “Zhongguo yu Jierjisi
jinmingtian kuajing fankong yanxi,” (“China and Kyrgrzstan cross-border anti-terrorist
exercise today and tomorrow,”) Shijie luntan junshi luntan (World Forum Military Forum),
11 October 2002, http://216.40.227.4/wmf/posts/3603482.shtml; and BBC News, “China–
Kyrgyzstan conduct joint anti-terrorist manoeuvring exercises,” 11 October 2002, http://
216.40.227.4/wmf/posts/3603142.shtml.
64. “Foreign observers attend Chinese war games for the first time,” Renmin ribao
(Beijing), 26 August 2003.
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